Metanational Challenges for Japanese MNCs in Global Knowledge Economy by Ota Masataka
          WASEDA BUSINESS & ECONOMIC STUDIES 2005 NO . 41 
Metanational Challenges for Japanese MNCs 
     in Global Knowledge Economy
   by 
Masataka Ota*
1. Introduction 
    International business activities of Japanese MNCs in the 2011' century had 3 
unique characteristics. First, "Global Supplier Strategy", which focused on global 
efficiencies through exporting, played as the central policy of Japanese MNCs. Second, 
unlike their Western competitors, their operational expansion i to overseas markets was 
not done along with similarities ofmarkets. They had no alternatives but to expand their 
operation drastically into Western advanced markets (particularly U.S.) which were 
positioned at the other end of the continuum of social system and cultural values. Third, 
the organizational rchitecture of Japanese MNCs, manufacturers in particular, has 
always been integral model during all the periods from 1960s through 1980s of such a 
miracle conomic growth, the epoch-making Plazan agreement in 1985, and finally into 
the 21" century now. 
    These closely interrelated three characteristics had been effective in global 
competition of the 20a' century, but they face strategic and organizational problems in 
this current global knowledge conomy. This article argues why and how Japanese 
MNCs had developed those characteristics and how they should respond to the rapidly 
changing lobal competition ofthe 21" century.
2. Internationalization Strategies of Japanese MNCs in the 20'1, Century 
1) Global Supplier Strategy as the Operational Destiny 
    International business operations involve three strategic alternatives; Foreign Trade, 
FDI(foreign direct investment), and Strategic Alliances, While the ideal operation would 
be a mix of these three, the pattern of mixture is strategically determined by the 
organizational c pabilities of and competitive challenges for a particular company. 
    Japanese companies had no alternatives, however, but to choose foreign trade as its 
only available national policy. As widely known, their business model was to import law 
valued materials from overseas, to process them into high valued products by using
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quality human resources and unique organizational process, and then to export those 
products at relatively law prices. People argue this is because Japan is a natural resource 
poor country. It is partly true, but another greatest factor is the rate of Japanese yen to 
U.S. dollars. 
    Importing is favorable and competitive when the currency of one country is strong 
to US dollars, while exporting beneficial otherwise. It was natural, therefore, that 
Japanese companies had been long dependent on exporting as their primary international 
strategy. For almost 40 years from the end of World War II in 1945 until Plaza 
Agreement in 1985, as shown in Table 1, Japanese yen had been relatively kept 
depreciated in spite of her increasing economic power during that period for some 
reasons.
Table l Changes in International Market & Foreig 
1945-1970 (Fixed Exchange Rate System;`49-71) 
The end of WWII (1945) 
Capitalizing of favorable exchange rate, Japanese manufacturers 
(e.g. Matsushita) starts FDI in ASEAN as their overseas f ctory 
 exporting toJapan & Western markets. 
1971-1984 
 Nixon Shock & Smithsonian Agreement (1971) 
 Complete Shift to Floating Exchange Rare System (1973) 
 Japan leads NIBS based on "Flying Goose Model" 
 Mahathir advocates "Look East" Policy (1981) 
1985-1996
n   Exchange Rate for Japanese MNCs
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~ US$1=¥360(1949-1971)              16
.88% revolution
eement 71) ' US$1=¥308(1971)
} US$1=¥300-26((-1985)
Plaza Agreement(1985) • US$1=¥235(1985) 
Increased local manufacturing  US and Europe ¥140(1987, 
Rise of ASEAN based on "Flyinf Goose Model" US$1=VI50-90(-1996) 
Japanese Bubble conomy & US New Economy; huge amount of 
residual money floods into ASFAN J ¥79(1995) 
1997-present 
Asian Currency Crisis (1997) 
Drastic increase in presence of Western MNCs (in service business US$1=VI20-100(-2005) 
in particular) inASEAN, replacing Japanese MNCs 
Rise of Chinese market and its MNCs J 
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e-ofJRM:Japan e dASEAN-Tbe       Forum ofRunnnr Apex Borden, \Waseda Univesi,y lesimm for in                                                    Resnveh Business Admi,risnavion
   The dollar-yen exchange rate, which had been fixed at US$ 1= ¥360 since 1949, 
was sharply revalued by 16.88% to go up to US$ 1= ¥308 by Nixon Shock on August 
15, 1971 followed by Smithsonian Agreement on December 18 of the same year. Under 
the preceding 22 year long fixed exchanged rate system, however, the Japanese yen to US
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dollar ate remained unchanged in spite of her steadily accumulated conomic power. It 
consequently provided Japanese companies with a sort of virtual depreciation of the 
Japanese yen. 
    After the floating exchange rate system was internationally adopted in 1973, the 
trend of dollar appreciation continued. President Nixon who suffered from Vietnam 
War held the strong dollar policy to bring money into U.S. from the rest of the world. 
Suffering from the so-called twin deficit, or public finance account deficit coupled with 
trade and current deficit, President Reagan also took his high interest rate policy to invite 
money from overseas into U.S. In the meantime, a number of Japanese MNCs like 
Toyota, Honda, Matsushita, SONY to name a few, had already gained huge competitive 
advantages to the extent hat Ezra Vogel admired them in his sensational hook "Japan as 
No. 1: Lessons for America (1979)" or William G. Ouchi of UCLA published his 
controversial book "Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese 
Challenge (1983)." 
    With such a favorable exchange rate continuing in chose periods, Japanese MNCs 
could accumulate heir strategic levers into the next stage of internationalization, i.e.
overseas manufacturing or management. Some Japanese MNCs strategically tried to 
maximize benefits from this handicapped game until the very last minute. Who most 
benefited this way would be Toyota. Toyota started its local manufacturing after having 
secured its home market share completely, while exporting its quality automobiles under 
favorable conditions and, moreover, learning carefully what such competitors a Honda 
and Nissan struggle in their overseas manufacturing. 
    The strategy taken by most Japanese MNCs is known as "Global Supplier 
Strategy." Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Goshal also labeled Japanese MNCs as 
"Global Company" in their book "Managing across Borders (1989 & 1998)." This 
strategy features an extremely efficient and effective home-based production system, 
exporting high quality and high valued manufactured goods through the excellent 
international networks of the Japan specific organizations, Sogoshasha, just like sending 
oil through their globally networked pipeline. In a sense, Japanese manufacturers and 
Sogoshosha c n be described to have formed a very close collaboration r specialization 
at national level. 
    Meanwhile, the critical factor of global competition migrated from comparative 
advantages classically provoked by David Ricardo to competitive advantages byMichael 
Porter. Recognizing much greater importance of competitive advantages brought by 
MNCs, U.S. and other member countries of G7 took the strong initiative to close Plaza
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Agreement in 1985 in order to force Japanese MNCs to join them in playing a global 
chess game through FDI as welt 
    On the other hand, the U.S. had since the end of WWII enjoyed an absolutely 
powerful position as the only and most advanced country for many years in economics, 
business, and technological innovation etc. Through 1960s and 1970s it was no 
exaggeration that all the innovations came out from U.S. Capitalizing on the 
overwhelmingly strong U.S. dollars over any other currencies, US MNCs naturally chose 
their international expansion through FDL The research by Raymond Vernon and his 
team of Harvard found that most US MNCs in 1960s went overseas in order to 
maximize benefits from the international product life cycle theory. Before entering the 
growth or second stage of product cycle in U.S. market, U.S. MNCs expanded into a 
foreign country that showed market similarities in socio-cultural variables, but that was 
positioned in the less developed stage in economic and technological spects. Through 
this mechanism they could lengthen the life of a particular product much longer than in 
case of not going overseas. 
    Like or curse it, US MNCs could never take the export based strategy which cannot 
be legitimate at all by the foreign exchange mechanism. Such an overwhelmingly strong 
U.S. dollars never allowed US MNCs to benefit from exporting even if they were 
equipped with equivalent institutions to the Japanese former MITI (currently METI; 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) and Sogoshoshas like Mitsubishi or Mitsui. 
    Without foreign exchange rate, the result would remain the same. The assembly 
line or facilities which have so far manufactured one generation older products must be 
removed so that a room for manufacturing new products can be secured. For that 
purpose, the old facilities must be transferred to foreign countries with markets 
similarities where local manufacturing is more feasible. In a sense, US MNCs gain two 
birds with one stone. The first bird is benefits from an FDI based operation legitimated 
by the absolutely strong dollar. And the second is reuse of old system that was transferred 
to overseas where they can still supply just one generation older products for local 
markets for whom the products can be enough innovative and competitive. This is just 
the other side of the same coin, vis-a-vis the global supplier strategy adopted by Japanese 
MNCs.
2) Order of Entry into Foreign Markets 
    Another difference between Japanese MNCs and U.S. counterparts resides in the 
order of market entry overseas. While the Japanese targeted the Western markets at the
4
earliest stage of its internationalization process after AWWII, the U.S. took a very 
authentic approach to incrementally enter the markets with high similarities. Essentially 
it should he convenient and favorable for even the Japanese to enter neighboring Asian 
markets where the impact of tyranny of distance ismuch smaller. The nearest and largest 
market for the Japanese companies has always been China, which was closed by its 
Communist Party for many years until 1972 when the Japan-China relationship was 
normalized. Besides, no effective demands for Japanese manufactured goods existed 
locally in China at that time. The greatest bottleneck, however, was the negative memory 
of then Japanese militarism of W WII, so Japanese companies could never consider China 
as either a production site or potential market. 
    This is basically true for Korea as well, while the Korean market size is not as big as 
that of China. The Korean government continued to take a protective trade policy 
toward the Japanese products, o Japanese companies could not choose Korea as possible 
market either. Japanese consumer electronics ompanies like Matsushita entered such 
ASEAN countries as Thailand and Malaysia s early as 1960s, because these countries 
showed milder attitude toward the Japanese. But the incentive and motivation of 
Japanese companies was to take advantage of these countries as production sites to export 
to U.S. or Europe through Japan. This strategy was feasible only because the currencies 
ofASEAN countries were all weak to Japanese yen. 
    Unlike IT business that can simultaneously cover the global market from a single 
site, most conventional businesses need to gradually secure such physical presence as 
stores or factories in each local market overseas. Duplication strategy better fits the latter, 
while scaling strategy might go better with the former (von Krogh & Cusumano 2001). 
It would be wiser for most companies of any national origin to start to enter easier 
markets except he case that an overwhelming core competence is available. Whether 
through exporting or EDI, in terms of tyranny of distance in a physical or psychological 
sense, it should be more efficient and effective to expand business activities along with 
similarities ofmarkets. Actually not only US MNCs but also such European MNCs as 
IKEA (see Table 2) has taken this approach coupled with competitive duplication 
strategy featuring its unique "Black Box."
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               Table2 Duplication Strategy: IKEA Case 
 1954 Founded by Ingvard Kampead as Swedish manufaturers and retailers of furniture with sales of 2 
 million Dutch grader. IKEA means his initial and his farm Elmtaryd in Agunnayd. (The name of IKEA 
 had been already registered by Kamptad as general merchandisers in 1943) 
 1958 IKEA'S lust store opened in Almhult (Sweden)(6,700rnt) 
 1963 The first foreign store in Oslo, 65 opened in Stockholm, 69 Denmark's first store opened 
 1973 The first sore outside Scandinavia opened in Zurich, 74 Germans first store in Munich, 
 75 the first store in Australia, 76 the first store in Canada, 77 the first store in Austria, 
 79 the first store in Netherland 
 1981 the first store in France, 83 the number of empoyees reached 6,000, 84 The first store in Belgium. 
 Sales reached 2,679 billon Dutch gtdder. 100% of Kamprad's personal stocks transferred to IKEA Stitching 
 Holland (a charity fimndation), 85 The first U.S. store opened in Plymouth Meeting (Philadelphia), 87 
 the For UK store opened in Warrington, and then entered London, 89 The first store in Italy 
 1990 The first store opened in Hungary and Poland, 93 Grew up to 114 stores in 25 countries, 96 The 
 first store in Spain, 98 The first store in China 
-2000 The first pore in Russia was opened 
 2002 Total sales increased to 12 billion Earn. Entered ahout 30 countries as Franchiser and directs owner of 
stores with 75,500 employees. Sales ratio : Europe (77%), US (19%), Middle Ease/Ansrralia/Asia (4%) 
Sourre _ O KA, .MNemda (2003) Collaboouv, ,f AS AN -d),-... MNC,, 1k, 2Y' Ogee Sy,apndum s'/A&1. J gars id ASIAN-I3a 
      Furvm sf8wi..eo A..~ 8srdrss Wzwda Uni,rersiry In,ims 6e Resead.u, sssaas Ao ii-I...ion
    This is also the case for such Chinese merging MNCs as TCL, Li Fan, and Aucma 
who are aggressively moving into ASEAN, particularly Vietnam, to start its local 
manufacturing of color TVs and motorcycles in Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi. Perhaps 
Haier is an exceptional case in that they attempted toenter the U.S. market with their 
niche product, or tiny refrigerators frequently found in hotel and motels. In general, 
however, it is an absolutely legitimate strategic decision for most Chinese emerging 
MNCs to enter their neighboring countries by leveraging their strategic strength. 
    It is well known that Nissan chose Finland as the first exporting target among 
Western markets. Then top management of Nissan, reportedly, thought that their 
products would be favored by Finnish people because Japan was the first and only 
country to defeat Russia from whom Finnish people have historically long suffered hard 
pressures. The Nissan management expected this logic to work favorable for promoting 
Nissan cars in Finland. This would be a case of capitalizing on the proximity of psyche 
distance, not the proximity of geographic distance. 
    As a sort of unintentional result, however, the entry strategy of Japanese MNCs 
functioned as a great leverage, as Anglo-American economy became dominant globally. 
Because their success in North America enabled Japanese MNCs to enter European 
markets with just relatively fine-tuning and vice versa. In other words, very strong 
pressures to shift up to top gear at the starting point consequently helped Japanese 
MNCs to operate with relative asiness in the 3'1 or 2rd gear position. While Japanese
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MNCs also used the black box strategy like IKEA, the difference is the way of 
formulating or configuring the black box. The latter's was done in an incremental way, 
but the former's in a destructive way which provided Japanese with a very unique global 
competitiveness. 
3) Integral Model as Organizational Genes 
    The third and most critical characteristic is that the mindset and core competence 
shared by most Japanese manufacturers are based on integral model architecture. It is 
organizational processes volved from Japanese high context communication system. It 
was reinforced by the successful g obal supplier strategy under which high quality 
products were made most efficiently only by Japanese mployees through such Japanese 
management system as lifetime employment, seniority-based wages, enterprise-based 
union, and just in time system etc. 
    In the meantime there were two big opportunities for Japanese MNCs to change 
the global supplier strategy. The first was Nixon Shock in 1971 when the Japanese yen 
was sharply revalued. But, as put earlier, since the U.S. government continued its high 
interest rate policy and, as a result of that, Japanese yen was kept to be relatively 
depreciated, the business model of Japanese MNCs remained unchanged. Through a sort 
of social specialization f Sogoshoshas and manufacturers, Japanese MNCs continued to 
export high quality and high value added products which were made by highly efficient 
production system operated by only Japanese. 
    The second was Plaza Agreement. Relentless appreciation pressure ofJapanese yen 
forced Japanese MNCs to rush into local manufacturing or local management in 
Western markets, particularly in U.S. This destructive paradigm shift finally forced 
Japanese MNCs to take off from their long held global supplier strategy. Such a drastic 
migration of operational lternatives gave a great impact on strategic aspects of the 
Japanese manufacturers, but it did not change their organizational core competence 
accordingly. 
    After Plaza Agreement, he business operation of Japanese MNCs apparently 
migrated from export o FDI, but the working organizational processes at profound 
levels continued to be critically influenced by their organizational genes or DNA. Almost 
all the FDIs done by Japanese MNCs were Greenfield typed, not M&A typed. This is 
because the production systems of Japanese MNCs have always been based on integral 
model. Against Chandler's argument, the organizational processes of Japanese MNCs did 
not follow their new operational strategy. Rather it might be natural that organizational 
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processes -the most critical determinant of business model- are harder to change than 
strategy which is more subject o changing competitive environments. Neither strategy 
always follows organization, nor does organization follow strategy automatically.
3. Organizational Processes Do Not Always Follow Operational Strategy 
1) Advantages ofIntegral Model 
    Integral Model is an evolutionary mass production system. Nowadays, in terms of 
organizational architecture, two basic mass production models exist; Integral Model and 
Differential (or Open Module) Model. Integral Model has been largely adopted by 
Japanese manufacturers, while Differential Model became rapidly dominant after IT 
revolution. 
    The strategic intent of Integral Model is maximizing value differentiation in 
products or services. Elements needed are ; 1) Closed architecture, 2) Keiretsu-networks, 
and 3)"Suriawase"(integration through extremely sophisticated a justment) production 
system. Advantages of integral model are as follows: 
1. Offering highly differentiated products and services based on a unique 
   architecture 
2. Very strong and close collaborations among members of Keiretsu group whose 
   center of excellence isa large assembler like Toyota or Matsushita 
3. Extraordinarily fine-tuned architecture that enables the ultimate elimination 
   of redundancies 
4. Artistically tiny and light, thin and sleek, and compact and well-packaged 
   products whose parts or components are individually developed and designed 
   (Yasumuro 2001) 
     Figural Advantages and Limitations of Wholly Owned Subsidiaries
                M & A Greenfield 
Advantages I Rapid entry Defense of state of the
Access to distribution channels 
Exsiting management experience 
Established brand names 
 and reputation 
Reduces competition
I
I
 art (emerging)                ology 
Integrated production 
Operational efficiency
  
cechn
Limitations
                 coordination problems 
            Fit with existing business 
Sources Douglas, S,P, & Cavg, C. 5. (19957 Global Madwing Seategy, McGaw HJI, p.166 
R
Integration with existing 
 operation 
Communication and
Investment cost 
Needs to build b 
Time delays
usmess
    Greenfield typed FDI takes the form of wholly owned subsidiaries. As shown in 
Figure 1, while wholly owned subsidiary through M&A are effective to rapidly enter the 
targeted overseas market, Greenfield typed one is more effective for integral production 
which in turn can greatly contribute to defense of emerging innovation or technology as 
well as maintenance of their unique organizational process. M&A takes much effort and 
time to transform human resources in which the organizational process or culture of the 
acquired organization is deeply embedded. 
    On the contrary, Greenfield typed wholly owned subsidiary can build the most 
desirable facilities and also recruit he new local employees to be trained in Toyota way, 
Honda way, and whatever. One of the greatest reasons why the Japanese automobile 
manufacturers chose Kentucky or Tennessee asthe locus of their production facilities is 
that they could recruit local people who were not imprinted with the U.S. automobile 
conventional practices (Goshal & Westney 1993). As represented byJust-In-Time (JIT) 
system, Japanese MNCs are excellent in making high quality products. Comparing 
mobile PCs launched at the same period of time, such Japanese products as SONY or 
Matsushita lways have smaller, lighter, and thinner package than Dell, for example. 
This is because the new models of SONY and Matsushita re manufactured with integral 
model, while Dell's with differential model, or open module model. 
    In the meantime, Japanese consumers also play a very important role in this 
successful evolution of the Japanese integral model, because Japanese manufacturers 
continue to develop those highly sophisticated products that satisfy such meticulous 
requirements of Japanese consumers. The Japanese consumers are more positive about 
purchasing those innovative products with less attention to pricing than their Western 
counterparts, as observed in such a successful market share taken by European high 
quality branded companies like LVMH in the Japanese market. The Japanese consumers 
are not price conscious but rather quality or innovation conscious. 
    And investment in development of extremely innovative products can be fully 
amortized by the repeated purchase of Japanese users, who enthusiastically but 
unintentionally become powerful contributors to a sort of social amortization 
mechanism every time the new model is introduced. They encourage an evolution of 
integral model that enables excellent making of quality products.
2) Organizational Processes and Japanese FIRM 
       Japanese companies still have a tendency to prefer fresh college graduates to
the holders of Master degree in social science (including MBA) or humanities. With the
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 global marketplaces transforming into knowledge conomy based, this tendency is 
 becoming less dominant. In factt he number of college students who continue study at 
 graduate schools is slightly increasing even in the social science area, and a number of 
 universities opened their MBA programs in the last decade. In reality, however, a 
 majority of Japanese companies still prefer college graduates. 
        In Japan most MBA programs are offered in the evening of weekdays and the 
weekend. This suggests hat a few businesspeople lan to change their current affiliation 
after earning an MBA. Another eason behind this phenomenon is the lower liquidity of 
Japanese labor market han that of U.S. or Europe. A questionnaire survey conducted in
August and September 2004 by a semi-government agency says that 78% supports the 
revival of lifetime employment system and 66.7% for seniority-based wages. It is 
particularly interesting that 64.2% of male and 66.4% of female among employees in
their 20's support lifetime mployment system. 
     This is also because the organizational processes of Japanese companies, particularly 
manufacturers, have been heavily dependent on tacit knowledge and informal human 
communication networks. As a result of that, Japanese companies prefer recruiting 
college graduates whom they can easily imprint heir organizational processes and values 
based on tacit knowledge from the scratch. A research onducted by Hansen, Nohria, & 
Tierney (1999) shows that such U.S. strategy consulting firms as BCG, Bain, and 
McKinsey, who favor "Personalization Strategy" based on tacit knowledge, hire top-tier 
MBA graduates after several time hard interviews, compared to system consulting firms 
like present Aecenture (then Andersen Consulting) who adopt "Codification Strategy" to
recruit alarge number of new college graduates (Hansen, Nohria, & Tierney 1999). 
    The president from the Japanese subsidiary of a certain Boston based strategy 
consulting firm once told me that his office recruited over 10 new college graduates out 
of about 20 recruits in 2002, while his U.S. parent firm, as Hansen, Nohria, and Tierney 
argued, recruited only competitive MBA holders from top business schools in the same 
year. For even the Japanese subsidiary of US based strategy consulting firm who seems 
more likely to follow the US styled FIRM, things are not so different from the typical 
Japanese companies.
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Figure 2 Or ganizational Capabilities & R-P-V Framework 
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    Japanese companies undoubtedly like to recruit inexperienced new college 
graduates, because all the employees - whether white collars or blue collars, or whether 
candidates totop management or factory workers - need to be trained so that they can 
share the organizational processes and values through tacit knowledge. This approach 
enables all the members from top to lower management to implement well-packaged, 
complicated or sophisticated tasks. As Christensen argued in his RPV framework, 
Resources, Processes, and Values must work in the same direction to be competitive 
(Christen 2000; see Figure 2). In a sense, what Japanese manufacturers are doing 
supports his argument. 
    On the other hand, as the inevitable result of their strong organizational processes, 
Japanese companies are not good at diversity management, particularly managing 
multicultural team. In fact they used to be criticized in that they do not promote local 
people to upper management i  their subsidiaries overseas. Besides, when the US dollar 
yen rate began to move unfavorable for global supplier strategy in late 1970s through 
mid 1980s, they did not choose to import cheap labor in order to increase factory 
productivities. Unlike Western countries, they tried to solve the worker shortage problem 
as well as the increased human resource cost by introducing assembling robots. Japan has 
since then been famous for the most advanced country in robotics. 
    Unlike Germany who received seasonal labors from Eastern European countries or 
Turkey, Japan could not take advantages of cheap labor from overseas, particularly 
neighboring countries, due to trauma of WWII. This is basically the same reason, as 
argued earlier, why Japanese MNCs could not expand into overseas long with market 
similarities. In this point as well, we can see a sort of strategic onsistency which 
functions to build the global supplier strategy. 
    Amazing advances in robotics upported the global supplier strategy, but it was not 
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just the result of technological advancement, bu  rather the result of characteristics of 
Japanese FIRM as well. One of the reasons ofthis tendency is that heir organizational 
processes have been heavily dependent on tacit knowledge and high context 
communication system. And this can be soon disadvantageous in the global knowledge 
economy where diversity management based on multiculturalism i  vital. 
4. Organizational Process Supported by High Context Communication 
     Japanese human communication processes are based on high context 
communication behaviors. Here, context isdefined as socio-cultural, historical, and 
psychological environments existing between the sender and receiver of a given 
communication drama. It also refers to commonly accessible frame of reference to both 
parties, which facilitates s mantic sharing ofinformation. 
     High context communication means that the amount of context which both the 
sender and receiver have already shared isgreater. This communication pattern isvery 
effective for the Japanese organizational processes, although it takes much time for all the 
organizational members tointernalize the context. But once it was learned, the 
performance of organization or team will sharply increase, because they operate just like a 
semi-self-organization. 
     The Japanese high context communication processes have 3 interesting 
characteristics (Hayashi 1985 & 1994). First, the Japanese p ople do not express what is 
self-evident in or should be learned from the context. Why they rather t y to be silent in 
discussion rtalking when he/she is a stranger o novice to any social group can be 
attributed to this characteristic. They are expected to be familiar with the context before 
they speak actively. Many Westerners say that the Japanese students do not raise 
questions very much in the classroom. This is also why, from elementary school days, the 
Japanese tudents are instructed to listen to the teacher until he or she has finished a 
story and then to ask only relevant questions. 
    Second, ialog cannot be active or effective until configuration of the context in
question has been identified oruntil the identity of the communication c unterpart has 
been known. Exchanging ame cards at the earliest age of communication process is a 
good example, because they can learn each other's context soon from affiliation or 
position printed on the cards and also can measure a sort of social distance between 
them. Once the counterpart's background is identified favorably, they suddenly start to 
communicate like old friends, particularly when they found themselves to be the 
graduates of the same university. Usual cross-cultural communication text books 
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featuring something like "Dos and Don'ts in Japan" only suggest that exchanging ame 
cards be learned as an important protocol in Japan. Profoundly, however, exchanging 
name cards means much more than just a protocol. 
        Third, those who control or create, or who are just most familiar with the 
context involved will determine the meaning and, in most cases, become the boss. Why 
leadership cannot be educated effectively in Japan and also why the Western people 
cannot understand the process in which the Japanese l aders are selected can be ascribed 
to this characteristic. 
    High context communication e ables 1) the effective sharing of tacit knowledge, 2) 
the flexible problem-solving among insiders, 3) the powerful organization climate, and 4) 
the human networks based on a long term trust. The extent o which a society depends 
on context differs from country to country, but the Japanese are ranked as the highest, 
while the lowest is Swiss German. Given that, we can easily understand how effectively 
these advantages contributed to building the Japanese organizational processes which 
features Integral Model. 
   Another good example is Keiretsu which is highly based on the high context 
communication system. After WWII, all the Zaibatsu groups like Mitsubishi, Mitsui, 
Sumitomo were dismantled by the US Occupation Army. Since these Zaibatsu groups 
had been controlled by respective holding companies, the holding company system was 
also prohibited. But the result was just the formation of Keiretsu system whose central 
governance r sided in Sogoshoshas, because they were believed to be the most excellent 
coordinator with great expertise of overseas markets as well as best human resources to
operate international business. 
    Holding company system was deregulated only in 1997, and very soon many 
holding companies emerged particularly in financial industry. In a sense, the Japanese 
Keiretsu system can be taken as quasi-holding company or an alternative institution that 
plays the similar ole of Zaibatsu in a more informal way. Keiretsu differs from Zaibatsu 
in that the former is more invisible. Keirersu has been indirectly managed and controlled 
by such invisible assets as human networks. And this might have mistakenly given such a 
mysterious image of Japanese management system to foreign people, in particular 
Americans and Europeans.
5. Organizational Challenges in the Global Knowledge Economy 
1) Nature of the 21st Century Global Competition 
    We have so far argued why and how the global supplier strategy was built and
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favored by Japanese MNCs, and why their organizational processes could not follow the 
change in their operational strategy. In terms of tie nature of today's global competition, 
however, their organizational genes can be disadvantageous. The 21" century global 
competition can be largely described as knowledge economy based as well as 
metanational/transnational riented. More specifically the following 5 mindsets are 
essential tobe a competitive global player now:
1) Information Based 
2) Knowledge Intensive 
3) Process Oriented 
4) Value Creative 
5) Cultural Context Responsive
    Apparently the first four mindsets ound favorable for Japanese organizational 
processes, because they would be skillful of managing very closely interwoven 
communication networks. But the problem is that these four mindsets must go well with 
the 5'" mindset, Cultural Context Responsive. This soon means the hardest challenge 
ever for Japanese MNCs, because it demands the change in their organizational 
processes, not just their operative strategies. Above all, diversity management i  cross-
cultural environments would be the most difficult challenge for them.
2) Production Oriented to Market Creation Oriented 
    The global competition of yesterday strongly reflects the logic of production. 
Actually almost all the conventional models or theories about internationalization 
process of MNCs are based on strategies or operations ofmanufacturers. Manufacturers 
basically prefers controlling and managing fewer production sites, if possible only one 
primary production site to realize global efficiency, just like global supplier strategy once 
taken by Japanese MNCs. 
    But today's global competition emphasizes the logic of markets, not just marketing 
but market creation. Marketing activities are challenged towork across borders, but a 
market itself cannot be detached from the given space or location, because each market 
has a very strong stickiness of information, knowledge, and cultural values. Globalization 
means that a number of new markets are emerging from every corner of the world, which 
will be interconnected thorough MNCs with advanced Triad markets to create more 
dynamic and innovative global marketplaces. Globalization is not the result of any
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intentional strategy, but an involuntary and endless process that continues to revolve and 
swing like a pendulum between convergence and divergence pressure. 
    Todays global community is more based on the logic of market whose core nature 
and dynamism are diverse. Basically production encourages dynamism of integration, 
but market features dispersion by nature. What Theodore Levitt (1983) provoked in his 
article "The Globalization of Markets", therefore, represents only one side of the coin of 
actual globalization. The meaning of the current globalization is not the same as "Global 
Reach" of the 20th century. As "Distance Still Matters (Ghemawat 2001)," however, 
specific needs or taste of each national market also matters even in the global 
marketplace. Rather the more deeply the globalization process advances, the more the 
market can be segmented or granulated in a more sophisticated way.
5. Condusion 
     In order to survive today's global competition whose nature is knowledge economy 
based and meranational/transnarional, Japanese MNCs must have the organizational 
capabilities that enable exploiting all the advantages of Foreign Trade, FDI (both 
Greenfield and M&A), and Strategic Alliances resourcefully. Increased amount of FBI is 
necessary to establish such physical presence as factories, tores, or offices globally. The 
greater the number of countries is involved the more Joint Venture or M&A across 
borders must be operated strategically. Then International Strategic Alliances hould be 
readily available as well. 
    In the 20°h century Japan was heavily dependent on its Global Supplier Strategy by 
successfully transforming her Country Specific Disadvantages into Country Specific 
Advantages, It was a correct solution in those days. In today's global competitive 
environment, however, the Global Supplier Strategy minded organizational processes can 
no longer work successfully. 
    The new organizational capabilities or processes must be built through excellent 
management of innovative tacit knowledge, which in turn must be made as explicit as 
possible. More critically, Japanese managers must develop themselves to be explorer-
typed communicators who do not easily depend on their own context, in other words, 
those who can manage zero-based communication behaviors across borders. At the same 
time, they need transform their organizational culture and climates to be metanational in 
order to facilitate diversity management, multicultural global teams in particular. For the 
Japanese MNCs these organizational challenges all differ from the challenges of 
yesterday.
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